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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 12-3099 
____________ 
 
BASSEM KANDIL; SAMEH A. ABOELATA;  
HALLA KANDIL, his wife; FLORA KANDIL, his wife 
 
v. 
 
GARY YURKOVIC, Police Officer; ANTHONY MARK ABODE, Police Officer;  
WILLIAM OELS, III, Police Officer; WILLIAM OELS, JR.; EDWARD T. 
BOBADILLA, Police Officer; CHIEF OF POLICE; CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK; 
NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE DEPARTMENT; MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
PROSECUTORS OFFICE; MIDDLESEX COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
 
BASSEM KANDIL; FLORA KANDIL, his wife, 
 
                                                                                   Appellants 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 06-cv-04701) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 13, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 14, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This case comes to us for the second time.  At issue is whether a release-dismissal 
agreement signed by Appellant Bassem Kandil is enforceable.  In 2011, we vacated a 
summary judgment against Kandil and remanded the matter for the District Court to 
decide whether Kandil’s agreement was enforceable as a matter of public policy.  Kandil 
v. Yurkovic, 448 F. App’x 228, 229 (3d Cir. 2011).  After additional discovery, the 
District Court again granted summary judgment against Kandil.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment as to Kandil’s federal claim, but will 
vacate as to his state law claims. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we recite 
only the facts and procedural history essential to its disposition.  A more detailed 
statement of the facts and procedural history is available in our prior opinion.  See Kandil, 
448 F. App’x at 230–31. 
 In the early morning hours of October 1, 2004, Kandil was arrested for disorderly 
conduct.  According to one of the arresting officers, Gary Yurkovic, Kandil instigated a 
belligerent confrontation with the police and then resisted arrest, which required the 
police to subdue him.  Kandil was later indicted for aggravated assault, resisting arrest, 
and disarming a police officer.  Although an internal police investigation accepted 
Yurkovic’s version of events and cleared the arresting officers of wrongdoing, several 
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witnesses claimed that Kandil was arrested after he and his friends began talking to a 
woman named Pamela who was in a sexual relationship with Yurkovic, and that Yurkovic 
and the other officers beat up Kandil without provocation. 
 About a year later, Kandil and Middlesex County Assistant Prosecutor Marcia 
Silva reached an agreement whereby the criminal charges against Kandil would be 
suspended and later dismissed in exchange for a release of all his civil claims.  Despite 
this agreement, Kandil sued under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, arguing that his 
agreement was unenforceable as a matter of public policy.  The District Court disagreed, 
and entered summary judgment against Kandil, holding that the release barred his claims. 
II
1
 
 We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 
same standard as the District Court.
2
  Slagle v. Cnty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 263 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  Summary judgment is proper ―if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‖ 
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In reviewing the District Court’s opinion, we are not limited to its 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the federal claims under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(a).  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2
 After the District Court granted summary judgment against him, Kandil moved 
for reconsideration, which was denied.  Kandil’s notice of appeal mentions only the 
denial of the motion for reconsideration.  However, ―an appeal from a denial of a Motion 
for Reconsideration brings up the underlying judgment for review.‖  McAlister v. Sentry 
Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552–53 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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proffered rationale, but rather ―[w]e may affirm the District Court on any grounds 
supported by the record.‖  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000). 
III 
 For a release-dismissal agreement to be enforceable under federal law, it must, 
among other things, be in the public interest.  See Town of Newtown v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 
386, 398 (1987); Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc).  More 
specifically, two requirements must be met.  First, there must be an ―objective‖ showing 
that the prosecutor proffered a legitimate public interest reason for entering into the 
agreement that was supported by the facts known to the prosecutor when the agreement 
was reached.  Though labeled ―objective,‖ this inquiry does not require an independent 
evaluation of whether Kandil’s claims are marginal or frivolous, as such an evaluation 
would entail the same costs and proceedings which release-dismissal agreements seek to 
avoid.  Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the prosecutors’ conclusion regarding the 
claims was reasonable in light of the evidence.  See Livingstone v. N. Belle Vernon 
Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 530 (3d Cir. 1996) (objective inquiry is whether ―the facts known 
to [the prosecutor] could have supported the conclusion that the [plaintiffs’] civil rights 
claims were marginal or frivolous‖ (emphasis added)); see also Cain, 7 F.3d at 383 
(―[T]here must first be a case-specific showing that the released civil rights claims 
appeared to be marginal or frivolous at the time the agreement was made.‖ (emphasis 
added)).  Second, there must be a ―subjective‖ showing that the proffered reason was the 
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prosecutor’s actual reason for entering into the agreement.  See Livingstone, 91 F.3d at 
527 (citing Cain, 7 F.3d at 381). 
 In this case, the prosecutors’ proffered reason for entering into the release-
dismissal agreement was that Kandil’s civil claims appeared marginal or frivolous.3  
There is a legitimate public ―interest in preventing the public fisc from being wasted by 
defending frivolous lawsuits.‖  Cain, 7 F.3d at 381; see also Rumery, 480 U.S. at 395–96. 
 Thus, the questions presented in this appeal are ―whether [Kandil’s] civil rights claims 
were regarded—and, if so, whether they were properly regarded—by the prosecuting 
attorney as marginal or frivolous.‖  Livingstone, 91 F.3d at 530. 
A 
 Kandil’s release-dismissal agreement satisfies the objective prong of the public 
interest test because ―the facts known to the prosecutor when the agreement was reached 
. . . sufficed to support the prosecutor’s proffered public interest reason for concluding the 
agreement.‖  Id. at 527. 
 Here, Kandil has presented some evidence that the police arrested him for an 
improper reason and used excessive force in doing so.  Witnesses testified that Kandil 
was acting peacefully on the night in question, and did not consume any alcohol.  On the 
other hand, there is significant countervailing evidence that Kandil was acting in an 
                                                 
3
 Defendants also suggested two other reasons the prosecutors might have entered 
into the release-dismissal agreement.  We rejected both of those reasons in the previous 
appeal and will not revisit them here.  See Kandil, 448 F. App’x at 234. 
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intoxicated and belligerent manner on the night in question and that the police did not use 
excessive force to subdue him. 
 First, the police department’s internal investigation concluded that the officers 
acted reasonably and without excessive force.  The investigation report noted that police 
reports filed at the time of the incident by Officers Yurkovic, William Oels, and Anthony 
Abode were consistent with their later interview testimony.  The internal investigators 
also interviewed four employees of the hospital where Kandil was taken after his arrest.  
These employees unanimously described Kandil as ―combative and aggressive.‖  App. 
1179.  One nurse also described Kandil as ―intoxicated.‖ 
 Another contemporaneous police investigation casts further doubt on Kandil’s 
version of events.  Immediately after the incident, Kandil alleged that the police were 
motivated to arrest him for racial reasons.  In response to this allegation, a police 
investigator interviewed Kandil at the hospital approximately eight hours after his arrest.  
In that interview, Kandil stated that he had consumed one gin and tonic that night, which 
conflicted with his witnesses’ later statements that he had nothing to drink at all.  In 
addition, the investigator ―detected a very strong [odor] of alcohol emitting from [Kandil] 
as he spoke‖ and noted that Kandil ―at times was [in very] close proximity to [the 
investigator] and at times . . . would even touch [the investigator’s] left arm.‖  App. 439. 
 Kandil’s evidence itself bears internal indicia of unreliability.  All but one of 
Kandil’s witnesses were friends who were with him on the night in question.  The one 
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independent witness was a woman named Lindsay, who was with Pamela that night and 
who was acquainted with Mohammed Farzaie, a member of Kandil’s group.  However, 
Lindsay’s testimony presents only a weak case of police misconduct.  Her testimony was 
presented in the form of a phone call with Farzaie, in which Farzaie repeatedly made 
leading statements and asked her leading questions.  Lindsay admitted that she did not 
know Yurkovic’s motivation for arresting Kandil, but only speculated that Yurkovic did 
so because ―maybe [Pamela] told them that she felt threatened‖ or ―maybe [Pamela] told 
them [Kandil’s group was] harassing me.‖  App. 674.  In addition, Lindsay did not 
observe the actual scuffle between Yurkovic and Kandil, as she was ―on the phone with 
[her] boyfriend‖ and ―[g]etting in the car getting ready to go home‖ when it took place.  
App. 679. 
 In sum, when all the evidence is considered, it ―could have supported the 
conclusion that [Kandil’s] civil rights claims were marginal or frivolous.‖  Livingstone, 
91 F.3d at 530. 
B 
 Having concluded that the prosecutors could have reasonably deemed Kandil’s 
claims marginal, we must turn to whether they actually considered them as such.  After 
our first remand, Prosecutor Silva was deposed.  In her deposition, she stated that she 
considered the merits of Kandil’s claim and discussed the issue of Pamela’s relationship 
with Yurkovic with her boss.  She also testified that Kandil’s witness statements did not 
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influence her decision to enter into the agreement and that she ―had no doubt reading the 
discovery, knowing that the case had been indicted by a Grand Jury, speaking to the 
officers and reviewing the discovery he provided, there was probable cause for arrest that 
night.‖  App. 624. 
 Kandil has presented no evidence indicating that Silva testified falsely or that she 
was trying to hide evidence of police misconduct.  In fact, Silva also testified that, ―I 
walked into Judge DeVesa’s on October 18th, I was trying that case, all the counts in the 
case.‖  App. 629.  Had she concluded that there was evidence of police misconduct to 
hide, she would have likely proposed the release-dismissal agreement earlier, rather than 
waiting for a settlement conference with a judge. 
 In addition, the criminal complaint against Kandil was filed two months before his 
notice of tort claim, and eleven months prior to the time he presented his evidence of 
police misconduct to the prosecutor.  Insofar as the public interest requirement is intended 
to ―curb the temptation to trump up charges in reaction to a defendant’s civil rights 
claim,‖ Cain, 7 F.3d at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted), that concern is not 
implicated here where the criminal charges were filed long before the prosecutors were 
aware of any civil claims.  Therefore, we agree with the District Court that the subjective 
prong of the public interest test is satisfied and that Kandil’s release-dismissal agreement 
is enforceable to bar his § 1983 claims against Defendants. 
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IV 
 Although we will affirm the District Court’s judgment on Kandil’s § 1983 claims, 
we will vacate the judgment insofar as it found Kandil’s state law claims to be barred by 
his release-dismissal agreement. 
Although the enforceability of release-dismissal agreements waiving § 1983 claims 
is a question of federal common law, the enforceability of such agreements releasing state 
law claims depends on state law.  Livingstone, 91 F.3d at 539.  Here, the District Court 
did not analyze under state law whether Kandil’s state law claims were barred by his 
release-dismissal agreement.  Therefore, we will vacate the District Court’s disposition of 
the state law claims and remand.  Of course, we leave to the District Court’s discretion 
whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 
V 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in 
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
